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“Transnational Xenophobia in Europe? Literary Representations of 
Contemporary Fears” 
 
Does an enlarged Europe harbor an enlarged fear of foreigners? Has EU expansion 
produced a bizarre, unintentional convergence in the xenophobic attitudes of eastern and 
western Europeans? What is the texture of this xenophobia in the different parts of 
Europe? This article is divided into three parts. First, it summarizes the contemporary 
European debate on fear of foreigners, antipathy towards immigrants, and the effort to 
enforce boundaries of national belonging. Second, it provides empirical evidence about 
national phobias using Germany and Poland as examples. Finally, it assays literary 
representations of European fears construed by select contemporary playwrights and 
novelists. The article proposes that the drama of European xenophobia is most effectively 
captured in the works of European writers, not in the discourse of EU leaders or social 
scientists. 
 
1. Foreigners, hostility, and hospitality 
Whether citizen attitudes towards foreigners are hospitable or hostile may represent, 
arguably, the most illuminating litmus test of a society’s democratic culture. As Étienne 
Balibar put it, "more and more, the modalities in which political programs of struggle 
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against exclusions and discriminations are defined and put to work constitute the 
touchstone of democracy in a world in which self-sufficient nationality has disappeared."1 
 
Xenophobia is, literally, a fear of foreigners. Xenophobes are considered to be those 
people who harbor negative attitudes to foreigners, motivated in large part by a fear of 
them. An extensive literature studying the psychological basis of xenophobia has pointed 
to how external threats increase group solidarity and ethnocentrism while, as a corollary, 
promoting intolerance and closemindedness.2 
 
A pioneering study of the EU explained the dynamics of xenophobia: "Foreigners are seen 
as carriers of a different culture with the potential to threaten the integrity of one's own 
nation. The assumption that the nation embodies culture comes from a belief that the 
nation is the arena in which critical values and beliefs are transmitted to developing 
members. Since each culture consists of a unique mix of orientations, foreigners inevitably 
threaten to alter the domestic culture through the introduction of new orientations."3 This 
understanding of what a national culture consists of transcends individual nations. 
Western and eastern European nations share a similar approach to protecting their distinct 
national cultures. The result is that a shared view of foreigners as threatening these 
cultures may create transnational xenophobia. 
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Hatred of the “foreign” had shaped the politics of nearly all European countries in the 
1930s. Anti-Semitism was its most horrific representation. World War II was an 
unprecedented enactment of racist hatred and led to the slaughter of millions of European 
citizens who no longer were viewed as belonging to European nations. Joseph Goebbels 
referred to German Jews as part of world Jewry, international Jewry, and therefore not 
German. The social construction of who were outsiders, then, had greater political salience 
than whether the place of origin of an ethnic or religious group was foreign or not. The 
presence of Jews was viewed as an erosion of the ethnic German community. As Göran 
Therborn put it, “Like all collective identities, European identity formation has faced two 
kinds of Others: one outside, beyond the range of the (potential) collective, the second 
inside, dividing the self to be made.”4 
 
Beginning in the 1950s Europe underwent a transformative process that made a fear of 
foreigners—those from the outside--salient. European modernity had primarily been 
shaped by emigration. During the first half of the twentieth century, outmigration, 
primarily to North America, had helped keep European states homogeneous and had eased 
their social conflicts. There were some differences among these states, of course. Whereas 
France was one of the few European countries that did not have sizeable out-migration, 
Italy had sent wave after wave of its sons and daughters abroad.5  
 
Hard as it is to believe today, postwar migration into Europe--though not new--caught the 
European public by surprise. Therborn highlighted the unprecedented nature of this 
development: "The shift from emigration to immigration represents an epochal change in 
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European social history. Ethnic--and largely continental ethnic--conflict has substituted 
for intra-European nationalist rivalry. The socio-political effect has been to weaken class 
cleavages and politics in favor of ethnic and other non-class ones."6 
 
While they never completely disappeared in the period of postwar reconstruction, racist 
and xenophobic politics began to make waves--again—in the 1960s when Europe sought 
to consolidate its economic comeback. The most important factor stimulating xenophobic 
attitudes was the foreigner originating from the Third World--not “foreigner” who was a 
citizen of another European state. To be sure, non-Europeans had been settling on the 
continent for centuries. But the difference now was in the sheer numbers arriving in a 
short time span. Though they appeared to be able to accommodate and absorb the new 
arrivals in practical ways--providing jobs, housing, schools, health care--host societies 
appeared psychologically unprepared to adapt to large-scale in-migration. Eastern Europe 
was largely sheltered from the new wave of Third World immigration by the communist 
cocoon in which it had been placed. It was the advanced western European states that 
faced the challenge of integrating immigrants and, conversely, developed xenophobic 
attitudes when integration did not occur on their terms. 
 
Historian Walter Laqueur contended that there was something quantitatively and 
qualitatively different about migrants in the last half century compared to their earlier 
counterparts: 
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There is, to begin with, the scale of immigration. Only tens of thousands came 
to Western Europe 100 years ago, not millions. They made great efforts to 
integrate socially and culturally. Above all, they wanted to give their children a 
good secular education at almost any price. The rate of intermarriage was high 
within one generation, and even higher within two. No one helped them: There 
were no social workers or advisors, no one gave them housing at low or no rent, 
and programs such as Sure Start (a British equivalent of Head Start) and 
'positive discrimination' had not yet been invented. There were no free health-
service or unemployment benefits. There were no government committees 
analyzing Judeophobia and how to combat it.7 
 
 
Laqueur’s implication was that the new wave of migration, beginning with Turkish 
Gastarbeiters to Germany in the 1960s, did not have to struggle to obtain rights; they had 
these conferred on themselves, in large measure as the product of a German and, more 
generally, European sense of guilt at their earlier treatment of minority groups, the 
colonized, and the powerless. “So long as Europe needed both guest workers and 
increasing populations, there was a convincing psychological explanation for the relaxed 
immigration regimes of the second half of the twentieth century. A sense of guilt over 
Europe’s colonial past and then World War II, when intolerance exploded into mass 
murder, allowed a large migration to occur without any uncomfortable debates over the 
real differences between migrant and host."8 
  
 
6 
It is also possible to infer from Laqueur’s account that recent immigrants have faced a 
host society backlash of a relatively benign kind compared to earlier groups of foreigners. 
The different purposes served by the symbols designating the outsider are instructive. As 
part of the process of othering in 1940, Jews in Germany were forced to wear a yellow star 
with Jude inscribed on it. This led directly to persecution and violence directed against 
Jews. By contrast, in the 1980s and after, othering was often performed by the outsiders 
themselves. Some Muslim women insisted on marking themselves off by wearing the veil, 
the headscarf, and even the burqa in public. There was no violent backlash in Western 
European states against these markers of self-exclusion. The Council of State in France 
was one of the only political institutions which drew the line at the burqa, announcing in a 
ruling in 2008 that French citizenship could not be conferred on a woman wearing this 
Salafist symbol of female subjection because it was in conflict with the values of the 
French Republic. 
 
Fear and dislike of foreigners may partly be the result of a perception that they are a 
privileged group with special rights, few obligations, and a desire to keep apart from the 
rest of society. Why citizens come to fear and even hate foreigners is a complex issue, 
however, and has been the subject of considerable research.9 Often the fear of foreigners is 
less self-induced than incited by those in authority so as to serve their interests. Simply 
defining a group as foreign can be an insidious act inciting xenophobic attitudes towards 
it. Russian literary critic Mikhail Bakhtin identified the importance of "official fear"--an 
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offshoot of the cosmic fear felt by humanity powerless in the face of nature.10 Political 
elites everywhere know the power of spreading fear among their citizens. 
 
Xenophobia is the repudiation of the notion of hospitality. Jacques Derrida theorized 
about the politics of hospitality offered to strangers. It was contingent in nature because it 
invariably involved legal and judicial systems grounded in the host society, above all, 
reflected in its immigration laws. These systems suspended and conditioned the 
immediate, infinite, and unconditional welcoming of the other.11 As elaborated by 
sociologist Meyda Yegenoglu, "conditional hospitality is offered at the owner's place, 
home, nation, state, or city--that is, at a place where one is defined as the master and 
where unconditional hospitality or unconditional trespassing of the door is not possible."  
 
Being ascribed the status of stranger frequently invites hostile reactions. As Georg Simmel 
contended, "a stranger is not one who comes today and goes tomorrow, but rather as the 
person who comes today and stays tomorrow."12 It follows that, as Zygmunt Bauman 
believed, strangers are "always uninvited guests" violating the basis of the host-guest 
relationship.13 Yegenoglu added:  
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it is not simply the crossing of territorial borders that turns migrants into 
strangers. Rather it was due to transgressing the dividing line between 
remoteness and nearness, between temporariness and settlement, inside and 
outside, that migrants became strangers in Germany. Because they trespass over 
the allowed borders of guest status, migrants engender uncertainty and 
ambivalence. By refusing to accept the termination of their allowed period of 
stay and thereby turning their temporary status into an unexpected permanency, 
they remain 'stubbornly and infuriatingly indeterminate,' to use a phase from 
Bauman.14 
 
2. Different Fears in Different Europes? 
An unstated assumption of EU enlargement has been that western Europe is morally 
obliged to save its eastern part from itself—its hatreds, paranoias, and squabbles. Yet a 
2003 study comparing eastern and western European xenophobia concluded that if there 
was a higher rate in the east it was "related more to recent structural changes than to more 
profound understandings of how 'us/we' is conceptualized."15 Two years later another 
study reported that "If one compares the state of racist extremism in Central and Eastern 
Europe to that in Western Europe, the differences seem less striking than is often 
assumed."16 The distinction between a supposed western "civic" xenophobia and an 
eastern "ethnic" one seems bogus. 
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To be sure, EU enlargement brought political and cultural differences between the two 
parts of Europe to the surface. Balibar went so far as to claim that "A veritable fracture has 
thus arisen, a sort of cold war after the Cold War…but one which is both plural and 
mobile, and which is hidden under a thick mythology about 'clashes of civilizations' 
between Eastern and Western Europe, supposedly inherited from religious tradition or 
from the form of state building, when not simply from the ethnic character of the nations 
involved."17 Balibar sketched a system of concentric circles leading from the "true" 
Europe (the advanced western states) to an "outer" one asking to be Europeanized (the 
eastern part).18 
 
The concept of an outer Europe seemed particularly applicable to Poland under the 
leadership of the Kaczyński twins. Respected Polish intellectual Adam Michnik—a 
hardened critic of the communist regime--attacked the anti-communist witch hunt that 
they had launched: Poland's "governing coalition employs a peculiar mix of the 
conservative rhetoric of George W. Bush and the political practice of Vladimir Putin."19 If 
anything qualifies as a characteristic of an outer Europe, this combination does. Abroad, 
the Kaczyńskis alienated both German and Russian leaders with their xenophobic politics 
and boorish behavior. The words of Immanuel Kant, advocate of a perpetual peace, 
written in 1798 came to mind: "Poland: that is a very strange country.... With them, there 
are no middle classes and, thus, they have little culture."20 
 
If Poland for a time seemed to belong to an outer Europe, was this reflected in xenophobic 
citizen attitudes towards foreigners? How did they compare with the German public’s 
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attitudes towards outsiders? While there are few strictly comparable attitudinal data, it is 
nevertheless possible to assay the strength and nature of their respective national phobias. 
 
A German public opinion survey (ALLBUS) discovered that from 1990 to 2000 more and 
more respondents concurred that asylum seekers—most of whom come from poor 
countries in the developing world—should have entry into Germany restricted. The 
percentage of respondents living in western Germany which asserted this climbed from 
50% to 73% over the ten year period. Surprisingly, the 73% figure for 2000 was higher 
than among the supposedly more xenophobic east Germans (69%). 
 
Between 1980 and 2002 Germans increasingly felt that foreigners in their midst should 
adapt their way of life more closely to the German one. Thirty percent of those in the FRG 
thought this in 1980 compared to nearly 40% in both parts in 2002. The groups identified 
in 2006 as having the least similar lifestyles to Germans were, by a wide margin, asylum 
seekers and Turks. It followed that marriage with a member of these groups was generally 
frowned upon (Table 1). Respondents were just as adamant that asylum seekers—in 
practice a proxy for poor people from developing countries--should not enjoy the same 
rights as Germans, though they were divided over whether Turks should have these rights. 
 
Table 1 How pleasant or unpleasant would it be for you if a member of one of the 
following groups married into your family? 
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        Very/quite pleasant     Very/quite unpleasant 
Italians              32           7 
German speakers      
from East Europe      
      17          20 
Asylum seekers               9          43 
Turks              12          40 
Jews              19          16 
 
Source: Allbus, 2006, Tables V160-164, 128-131. Very/quite unpleasant included the first 
two (1,2) on the seven-point scale. Quite/very pleasant scores included the last two (6, 7) 
on the seven-point scale. 
 
Survey results from 2006 indicated that the average German was far more hostile to 
groups coming from far away or which were Muslim than to culturally-affiliated groups 
like Italians, east European German speakers, and Jews. One noteworthy finding was that 
48% of respondents expressed indifference to having Jews as neighbors, reflecting 
acceptance of the politically correct line. This indifference stood in contrast to evaluations 
of other possible neighbors where opinion was more polarized. For example, the prospect 
of an Italian neighbor was appealing: 22% were very favorably disposed and just one 
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percent very negative. At the other end of the continuum, by a ratio of roughly three-to-
one respondents did not want an asylum seeker as neighbor. 
 
The data we have for Polish citizens' attitudes towards foreign groups are not comparable 
but they still reveal xenophobic orientations in the country. A 2007 attitudinal survey 
sought to measure Poles' "social distance" from other nationalities and religious groups. 
Poles were asked the classic question: Would you be opposed to your son or daughter 
marrying someone who was Jewish, or Russian, or Chinese? One-third of Polish 
respondents said that they would oppose their child's marriage to someone who was 
Jewish or Chinese, and one-quarter said they would oppose their child's intermarriage with 
a Russian.  
 
Poles voiced much stronger opposition, however, to interdenominational marriages. 
Respondents were somewhat more Islamophobic than anti-Semitic with 55% expressing 
opposition to a son or daughter's marriage with a Muslim and 47% with a Jew. Poles 
relented somewhat if a possible son-in-law or daughter-in-law was Christian: 
Orthodoxophobic views were expressed by the 38% of respondents who would oppose a 
son or daughter marrying someone of this faith. Marrying a Protestant was less critically 
perceived (31%). Antipathy towards a possible atheist son- or daughter-in-law was at 
about the same level as for an Orthodox one (37%).  
 
Someone of the same nationality and religion were two of the most important 
characteristics respondents looked for in a spouse, or friend, for that matter. Only the 
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factor "way of comporting oneself in public"--let's call it "having good manners"--was 
seen as more important than religion or nationality in a potential spouse. Educational 
level, occupation, and political views were less influential.21  
 
A longtitudinal analysis of survey results indicates important trends in the changing 
national likes and dislikes of Poles. In 1993 Italians, Americans, and Italians were 
bunched at the top of Poles' favorite nationalities. By 2006, however, six EU cohorts--
Spaniards, Italians, Czechs, English (which Poles use interchangeably with British), 
Dutch, and Irish--ranked higher than Americans  The sudden popularity of Spaniards and 
Irish is explained by the fact that these are two Catholic EU countries with which Poland 
has sometimes made common cause on EU policy. They have also been welcoming to 
Polish workers looking for jobs in the west. 
 
Poles' least preferred nationalities changed only slightly over this same period. In 1993 
Romanians were the least favorite: a -57% net difference between those saying they liked 
and those saying they disliked them! When Roma were added to the survey the next year 
they immediately overtook Romanians ( 69% in 1994). Three mainly Orthodox nations--
Ukrainians (-53%), Serbs (-45%) and Russians (-39%)--came next. Belorussians did not 
fare well either (-28%). But they were still comfortably ahead of Germans (-53%) and 
Jews (-36%). 
 
By a large margin (a -57% differential), Poles' least favorite "nation" in 2006 were the 
Arabs, who were first included in the survey in 2002. Roma came next (-44%) followed 
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by their namesake, Romanians (-36%). Turks followed (-31%) with Jews, Russians, and 
Serbs Orthodox tied at -25%. As many Poles now said they liked their EU western 
neighbors as said they did not care for Germans (at 33%).22 
 
Poles’ strong dislike of Arabs and Turks suggests that Poles suffer from a degree of 
Islamophobia, just like Germans do. To some extent Poles may be seen as 
Orthodoxophobes too, though it can be argued that dislike of Russians, in particular, has 
little to do with religious differences and everything to do with history. Finally, even 
though dislike of Romanians, Roma, and Jews--the latter two groups, significantly, often 
perceived as homeless, nomadic nations--has been declining, Poles share the historic 
antipathy towards such perceived "bogeyman nations" with many of their fellow citizens 
in Europe. Germans are more guarded in giving their views on Jews but they are more 
candid in expressing antipathy towards asylum seekers and, to a lesser extent, Turks—
groups that are considered non-Europeans. 
 
3. Cultural Narratives of Foreigners, Fears, and Self Loathing 
A particularly illuminating literary genre that captures relations between “locals” and 
“outsiders,” and between fixed identities and those in flux as a result of migration, is 
theatre. The sense of belonging and the process of othering--emotional and psychological 
phenomena that can be made tangible on stage—are themes that especially lend 
themselves to theatrical representation. It is no surprise, therefore, that many European 
playwrights and directors have addressed these subjects. 
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An eastern European classic is Polish writer Sławomir Mrożek's The Immigrants. Directed 
by Andrzej Wajda, the legendary film director, it premiered in a Warsaw theatre in 1976, 
at a time when many Poles were, for the first time under communism, able to leave the 
country to work--usually illegally--in Western countries, then return with savings that 
made them rich back home.  
 
The play features two characters: an intellectual and a worker from an unnamed far-away 
nation living together in a decrepit rented flat in a foreign country. The dialogue captures 
the hopes and fears of two men from very different social classes, brought together by 
their sense of belonging to a common ancestral home, by their living in a society alien to 
both of them, and by their common realization that their personal identities were in flux. 
 
The theme of emigration was resurrected by Polish theatre director Krzysztof 
Warlikowski. His production of Israeli writer Hanokh Levin's Kroum, staged during the 
2005 summer theatre season in Avignon, was widely acclaimed.23 The story concerns a 
man returning to his home country after a long trip abroad. Dressed in a cowboy hat and 
pulling a suitcase on wheels behind him, he arrives in his house in a dank quarter of Tel-
Aviv--a district that could be anywhere in Europe, or elsewhere. 
 
Kroum is reunited with his mother but he has an admission to make. "Mama, I haven't 
succeeded. I haven't found fortune or happiness abroad. I haven't progressed an inch, I 
didn't haven't fun, didn't marry, didn't even get engaged. I didn't meet a soul. I didn't buy 
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anything and didn't bring anything back. There's only dirty laundry and toiletries in my 
suitcase." 
 
Born in Tel-Aviv, the playwright Levin is a descendent of a well-known line of Hassidic 
rabbis from Poland. His satirical writings have often had Israel as a target, including how 
it changed after its victorious 1967 six-day war. Kroum confronts the loss of meaning and 
identity in a globalized world where individuals roam about striving for social 
advancement. Home is where they are fixed in the social hierarchy with few prospects of 
upward mobility. 
 
Thematically similar to Kroum is Ariane Mnouchkine’s "pageant of the uprooted"--Le 
Dernier Caravansérail (Odyssées).24 The title is meant to be ironic: a caravansérail is 
rooted in the Persian word which means palace, or the spacious place where caravans put 
up for a rest. Mnouchkine’s odyssey is a testimonial to the new existential nomads who 
wander the world, looking for landfall which they can call home. 
 
The six-hour saga is set in detention camps in France, Australia, New Zealand, and 
Indonesia. For Mnouchkine, a French avant-garde stage director who improvised the piece 
from narratives collected from refugees between 1999 and 2002, a cast of 36 represents 
the twelve million people trapped in the ghost life of detention centers and legal limbo 
around the world. "I hope the audience will follow our wanderings as we followed yours," 
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Mnouchkine implores in the Übertitel that opens Part 2. Wandering and unknowing are 
the experiences of the asylum seekers, and they are the tropes of this sprawling 
production. Through the caprice of history, émigrés find themselves with no rights, no 
voice, no place. 
 
The first scene in Le Dernier Caravansérail is of refugees trying to cross a raging river 
between Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan. They are hoisted over the torrent in a wicker basket 
whose rope and pulley are operated by a smuggler. The wind roars and the refugees’ 
shouts are muffled. The actors rappel horizontally across the stage. They slip, they 
struggle. A woman hesitates, then plunges into the current before she is hauled back up 
into the bobbing basket. One man is not so lucky: he is swept away. While upstage the 
audience sees him disappear in a swell, downstage we witness a drama being acted out 
about payment to a human smuggler. 
 
The image of water symbolizes the danger, bravery, desperation, and grueling physical 
and emotional costs of exodus. When, finally, the asylum seekers are safely on the other 
side, they trade insults with the smuggler: "Kyrgyz bastards! You race of dogs!" And the 
reply: "Kazakh bastard...! Stop moving across my country." 
 
Theatre in both new and old Europe captures the aspirations and desperation of 
populations moving across the world's borders. Hostility is more often what their 
migration evokes--not hospitality. But another subject that has appealed to European 
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playwrights is national self loathing—the discomfort of having to belong to a national 
group. Czech-born British playwright Tom Stoppard set his recent trilogy, The Coast of 
Utopia, in Russia of the 1830s. Featuring an imaginary debate among the great characters 
of the time, the play anticipates the questions that still haunt European identity today. 
Peter Chaadaev, the philosopher, asks about Russia: "How did we come to be the Caliban 
of Europe?"25 Vissarion Belinsky, the literary critic, summarizes a manuscript he has been 
reading: "it's all about how backward Russia is compared with Europe...the rest of Europe, 
sorry."26 The great anarchist Michael Bakunin expresses his frustration about rebellion in 
tsarist-governed Congress Poland: "Poland is simply impossible."27 Stoppard gives us a 
clear and concise summing up of the longstanding antipathies in the east of Europe. 
 
One of the great fears that divides Europe today is Russophobia. While western European 
nations have generally sought to accommodate Russia and institutionalize its place in 
European structures, eastern European countries continue to invoke Russia’s history of 
expansionism in order to exclude it from the European project. A pastiche of Polish 
Russophobia is at the core of the fictional world of Dorota Masłowska, a young writer 
who has documented the underclass trying to survive in the Poland of capitalism without a 
human face. It is not a world marked by upward mobility, prosperity, overnight fortunes, 
country villas, conspicuous consumerism. It consists instead of disempowered youth, 
junkies and alcoholics, wannabe rock musicians, racist skinheads, their vulgar language 
and uncouth habits, the bonds they forge with each other, and the dead ends they face in 
life. 
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Masłowska's first novel (and her only book available in English) is called Snow White and 
Russian Red; the more descriptive Polish title is "The Polish-Russian War under the Red-
and-White Flag." It presents a hyper-realistic portrait of small-town Polish society of the 
1990s. Nails, a socially marginalized kid dumped by his girlfriend Magda, turns to drugs, 
gutter punks, and xenophobia as surrogates. The novel spotlights both the anarchic and 
russophobic attitudes of young people in Poland--paradoxically the generation that had 
suffered least at the hands of Russian-imposed rule.  
 
Russkis--a pejorative word for Russians when used by Poles--are blamed for controlling 
the black market in knock-off cigarettes, pirated CDs, even Polish sand--these are some of 
their economic wrongdoings. They have raised the salinity of the Niemen river and are 
responsible for the arrival of gale-force winds--their part in environmental degradation. 
They also go off with grubby-faced dirty girls, demonstrating their lack of taste and 
culture. 
 
There are few insults that can be hurled in Poland worse than to say your "mother takes 
off her panties for the Russkies."28 By contrast, the best testimonial a Pole can receive is: 
"radically anti-Russki with right-wing tendencies," which denotes "individual 
achievements in the advancement of Polishness.'"29 The thinking pervading much of 
Polish society is, then, "Either you're Polish or you're Russki. To put it more bluntly, either 
you're a person or you're a prick."30  
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In 2006 Masłowska's first play, "Two poor Romanians speaking Polish," was staged in 
Warsaw. The main characters are a middle-aged Romanian couple hitch-hiking through 
Poland who encounter anti-Balkan antipathies. One Polish driver comments how he heard 
that "in that Romania they eat thorns, weeds, and rocks."31 A Polish woman who gives 
them a lift wants to show how much she knows about the Balkans: "Fuck. Hungary, 
Romania, Turkia, I know, a beautiful country. Everyone says Romania, filth, shit, 
excrement, Islam, kids eating shit from the sidewalks, that tyrant Cincinnatus ruling."32 
 
Eastern European self-loathing again makes its appearance in the play. Parcha, the 
Romanian husband, lashes out at his wife Dżina: "You have no shame! Woman, you're 
pregnant, you sniff glue, you curse, you stink up the car." He tells the first driver that 
picks the couple up: "You have to excuse her, she's a dumb Romanian, a lout, she worked 
her whole life in a factory of monkeys and dogs and doesn't know how to behave in 
public."33 Later he explains to a drunken middle-class Polish woman driving to Warsaw: 
"we're Romanians who speak Polish, we're lesbians, queers, Jews, we work in an 
advertising agency, like I said you know, we're going to Israel to plant trees."34 Whether 
the couple really are Romanians speaking Polish or drunken Poles playing a prank and 
mimicking Romanians speaking Polish is an academic question. In the first case, the two 
Romanians reach for what they guess is the negative Polish stereotype of their country. In 
the second, the two Poles try to capture the self-loathing Romanians feel as Romanians 
traveling in a more “western” country. 
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If eastern Europeans still smolder about each other in their own paranoiac world, 
Islamophobic narratives have increasingly marked western Europe’s literary scene. Michel 
Houellebecq has reveled in the controversy that his "frank" depictions of Islam, for 
example, in Platform published in 2002, has evoked. Ultimately the author holds Western 
liberalism and rationalism to blame for tolerating such a stupid religion (he was brought to 
court for inciting violence against Islam but was acquitted). The Western world has 
become so flabby that it cannot defend itself any more against reactionary ideologies like 
Islamo-fascism. "Because of its need for rational certainty, the West finally sacrificed 
everything: its religion, its happiness, its hopes, and definitively its life."35  
 
Houellebecq highlights the sordidness of today’s ethnic hatreds; few ethnic and racial 
groups have not been skewered in one of his books--French society included (in 
Elementary Particles). He adopts the traditional patronizing French view of its neighbor to 
the south: "standardization was doing its work… and Spain was approaching European, 
and especially English, norms." It was giving grudging acceptance to such extraordinary 
ideas as homosexuality, kindness to animals, vegetarian food, and New Age baubles.36 
Spain, where much of Possibility of an Island is set (and Houellebecq currently lives), is 
still not quite old Europe, however: "Spaniards don’t like cultural programs at all, nor 
culture in general, it’s an area that is fundamentally hostile to them."37 
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The author ridicules job seekers from eastern Europe even if the threat of the Polish 
plumber has no currency for him. In the brothels visited by David1, the main protagonist 
of Possibility of an Island, "most of the girls were Romanian, Belorussian, and Ukrainian, 
in other words from one of those absurd countries that emerged from the implosion of the 
Eastern bloc."38 The pornography industry "remained in the hands of shady Hungarian, or 
even Latvian, jobbers."39 Aging tourists at a holiday club are entertained to a Miss Bikini 
Contest where the main contestants are a leggy teenage girl from Budapest and "a 
platinum-blond Russian, very curvaceous in spite of her fourteen years, who looked a 
right tart" and subsequently "began stuffing her hand down her bikini bottom."40 After 
inevitably losing his slutty girlfriend to younger men, Daniel1 thinks to himself how "I 
could spend the night with a transsexual Slovenian whore."41 
 
The most offensive satires of foreigners in his novels are of Muslims. One character in 
Platform snarls: "Islam was born in the middle of the desert in the middle of scorpions, 
camels, and ferocious animals of all types. You know what I call Muslims? The scum of 
the Sahara...Islam could not be born except in a stupid desert among filthy Bedouins who 
had nothing else to do but--pardon me--bugger camels."42 There could be no doubt but 
that "the Muslim system was condemned: capitalism would be stronger. Already young 
Arabs dream of nothing else but sexual consumption."43Anti-Arab invective is found in 
other novels. In Elementary Particles Anne speaks of a holiday in Morocco where "the 
Arabs were disagreeable and aggressive, the sun was much too hot."44 In Possibility of an 
Island, Daniel1’s artistic output includes a rap record "Fuck the Bedouins," songs such as 
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"Let’s Fuck da Niggahs’ Anus," and a creation called We Prefer the Palestinian Orgy 
Sluts.45 
 
Houellebecq has been accused of misoxenia, blasphemy, and sexism--and racism. 
Invoking the most classic of stereotypes, Bruno in Elementary Particles remembers as an 
adolescent measuring his penis, which was only 13-14 centimeters long, at most. "It was 
from that moment on that I started hating Blacks."46 Elsewhere the French author speaks 
about a past colonial view of blacks as "an inferior brother," which constituted "a kind of 
benevolent, almost humanist, racism." But "From the moment that whites began to 
consider Blacks as equals, it became clear that sooner or later they would consider them as 
superior. The notion of equality has no foundation with man."47 Again blaming the West 
for encouraging jumbled ethnic hierarchies, "racial discrimination in reverse" also applied 
to Arabs, seen as inherently superior to Europeans.48 The author's exposé of western 
Europe's xenophobia—or is it his own?--adds a rich, personal texture to the 
phenonomenon. 
 
What is an emigrant to Europe—indeed, one in the first wave of Gastarbeiters coming 
from Turkey to Germany—to make of national fears, antipathies, and prejudices 
appearing on the continent? Emine Sevgi Özdamar arrived in 1965 at the age of nineteen 
and became fluent in German, allowing her to be a writer as well as an actress in her 
adopted home. Her first novel published in English was Mother Tongue. Her work "aimed 
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to capture an elaborate, multicolored snapshot of Turkish culture and migration 
experience" and to express "her longing for forgotten words and sounds of Turkish and 
Koranic Arabic."49 Her identity is located both in the home country and the receiving 
society, both in the remnants of a mother tongue (Turkish) and a foreign tongue (German) 
which has become her native tongue. Not surprisingly, "'For Germans, I'm a Turk, for 
Arabs German.'"50 
 
The author describes herself as a story teller who narrates in German, "the language of my 
day-to-day experiences" and "the language of some five million Gastarbeiters."51 In 
Mother Tongue, the narrator is told to explain what she is doing in her adopted country: 
"'What are you doing in Germany?'" asked the girl. I said: 'I'm a word collector.'"52 She 
lists all the Turkish and Arabic words that she has collected. In the afterword Özdamar 
writes: "We have no choice but to rebuild the tongue which we have lost with the tongue 
that we have found."53 
 
Although xenophobic attitudes are not palpable in her novels, ethnic stereotypes abound. 
Mutual constructions of the Other are on the surface respectful but in reality absurd. A 
donkey and farmer are heading for "Alemania." The donkey says: "'Didn't you hear? It 
rains pearls in Germany.'"54 A Turkish woman traveling to Germany tells her companions: 
"'I have seen their women. They iron and iron their hair. They sew up their bosoms every 
day or flop, let them hang down. Allah gave each of them an arse, but they only jiggle 
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with it, zirr--zirr--zirr.'"55 A Turkish man with his flock of sheep stands at the "Door to 
Germany" and warns a Turkish woman standing beside him: "'Woman, if you don't want 
to take the man's smelly cock in your mouth, then you should have cut off your legs and 
stayed at home.'"56 
 
Apart from Turkish self-loathing and stereotyping, Özdamar draws a pastiche of the 
proxenetic German who prides himself in his knowledge about Turkish culture. But even 
the self-congratulating advocate of multiculturalism finds a way to be cutting even when 
he is trying to be nice. The author elaborates: "along came a German, a lover of Turks" 
who talked incessantly about his friend who was Turkish. The German and his wife once 
stayed at the Turk's house. What did his wife and the Turk do? "They fucked and they 
fucked." Later the German tells some Turks he meets on the street: "In your country, you 
wash your arse with water after you have a crap, isn't that true? You see, I know that....I 
also always wash mine here."57 The absurdity of rote multicultural discourse is made 
evident. 
 
Similar tropes are presented in Özdamar's Life is a Caravanserai, published in English in 
2000. The novel describes a girl growing up in a rough social milieu in Turkey in the 
1950s and 1960s before she decides to emigrate to Germany. There was a hurdle to leap in 
order to quality for immigration to Germany: "In order to go to Germany you had to have 
medical tests, give urine samples, give blood samples, show your teeth." The narrator 
happily reported she had received her visa: "I had good urine. My path was clear."58 
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Prospective immigrants were given a "Handbook for Workers Going to Work Abroad." 
There was some plain advice for women: "In Europe you don't wear headscarves. If 
Turkish women wear headscarves, Europe will not love them."59 
 
The images of Germany were favorable. Turkish women believed that "When you get 
your period in Germany, you don't have to work, you get those days off."60 A Turkish 
woman remarked that "you'll find only cultured Turks there."61 But the train bound for 
Germany carried almost all Turkish women and they did not appear cultured. In a tone of 
self-parody Özdamar writes: "It was a train of whores....the train divided up into whores 
who combed their hair with men's semen and whores who spread men's semen on their 
bread and ate it."62 
 
Özdamar can write lyrically about her childhood on the border of Europe. Her parents had 
moved several times between the Asian and European sides of Istanbul. When traveling to 
European Istanbul on business, her father would choose elegant trousers and a shirt the 
night before. "During the night the white of the shirt would shimmer before my eyes, and 
it seemed as if the trousers and the shirt were so excited about their forthcoming trip to 
Europe that they were unable to sleep."63 The author also recounts a time sunbathing 
topless on one of the islands near Istanbul. A motorboat suddenly passed by and one of the 
men remarked about her: "Today is a fine day for looking at European goods."64 
 
 
 
  
 
27 
4. Transnational Xenophobia?  
National stereotypes, antipathies, phobias, rivalries, and biases still affect attitudes and 
behavior in old and new Europe. Western European publics have become more concerned 
about their burgeoning immigrant communities while eastern European citizens have 
tended to focus on the ethnic, religious, and regional squabbles of the past. If Muslim 
groups are most often othered in old Europe, by contrast it is Russians, Romanians, Roma, 
and Turks who are made into the alterity of eastern Europe. The phenomenon of 
xenophobia is transnational, therefore, but its targets differ from one region to another. 
 
European leaders have called attention to the rise of xenophobia. In 2008 they adopted a 
European Pact on Immigration and Asylum that highlighted how the EU had to be able to 
receive immigrants “with dignity.” That same year German Chancellor Angela Merkel 
used the occasion of the seventieth anniversary of the anti-Semitic riots of Kristallnacht to 
condemn all forms of racism; her views were echoed by Pope Benedict XVI. Nevertheless 
it is writers who speak to us most clearly about racism, xenophobia, hostility, and fear. 
Politicians rarely use words to tell the truth, but writers invariably do.65 It is to Europe’s 
cultural intelligentsia that we must turn for an understanding of the gravity of 
contemporary European fears.  
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